That's the topic of my op-ed in today's Crimson, which you can read here:
http://www.thecrimson.com/article.aspx?ref=515125
Give it a read and let me know what you think.
(I'm relatively happy that the number of unwanted grammatical "corrections" that editors typically apply before publishing was kept to a minimum, though there were still a couple that I didn't want.)
Also, here is an article I was sent yesterday by ISI from The American Conservative magazine that makes a number of points that support what I had to say about the party's current foreign policy. Caveat - This piece goes a lot farther than I can support, implying that the Gulf War was bad and was fought for Israel (um, what?), and implicitly opposing humanitarian intervention in Kosovo etc, but the more general thematic elements are still well-taken. Ultimately what it says has more resonance for the Iraq War than for the other wars. (Note: This article is long and tedious and keeps referencing "core" conservative writers that I've never even heard of - so just FYI, it makes all of the important points in the first 7 paragraphs and the last paragraph).
http://www.amconmag.com/2006/2006_11_06/cover.html
The last paragraph sums up this piece's argument best:
No single work by Kirk or Weaver or even Robert Nisbet—whose last books, Conservatism: Dream and Reality and The Present Age are strongly anti-militaristic—makes a comprehensive case against preventive war and interventionism. A casual acquaintance with the conservative canon wouldn’t change any College Republican’s mind. But students who seek a fuller knowledge will find little in the conservative intellectual tradition that accords with George W. Bush’s view of the world and America’s place in it. Increasingly, conservatives over the age of 65—including George Will, Milton Friedman, Jeffrey Hart, and Bill Buckley himself—have come to see the Iraq War as folly. If students critically engage the works of the wisest men of an even older Right, they too may be forced to conclude that George W. Bush is no conservative all—or else that Kirk and Weaver, like James Lawrence, are really leftists.
Finally, this piece in today's NYT is an important read. It describes the intra-party blame game that is already taking place among activists of different stripes who anticipate a major defeat in 3 weeks. Most relevant to the topic of this post is that it appears that David Keene and Grover Norquist agree with me on this issue (I'm happier about Keene's agreement than Norquist's, for a variety of reasons that I won't get into here, except to say that I'm disappointed Norquist doesn't support border security first.)
[Note: Anonymous posting has been re-enabled.]
According to Robert Novak, if nothing changes between now and Election Day, Democrats will pick up 21 Republican House seats, 6 more than necessary to control the House. If my math is right, that would put them up 12 seats.
Novak's Senate predictions (not shown here) have Democrats picking up 4 Senate seats, leaving Republicans with a slight majority there. It is important to note that the Senate is always (by design) resistant to political waves, since only 1/3 of its members are up for election at any given time. There is no reason to believe that Republicans would not lose the Senate as well if every seat were up for reelection this year.
For some reason, this week's issue of the Evans-Novak Political Report has not been posted online yet, so I have copied and pasted the most relevant part from the email below.
***
Election Outlook: For Republicans, the worst-case scenario we have described over the last few weeks seems to be shaping up. Democratic challengers in several districts once believed to be safe -- such as those of Chris Chocola (R-Ind.) and Charles Taylor (R-N.C.) -- were already holding on to solid leads even as the Foley situation took all the comeback momentum away from Republicans. Now things are even worse.
The upshot is that Democrats are holding their early leads and now reaching across the chart and putting more Republican races into play. The Foley Affair has started a current that runs against the GOP all over the country. In fact, given the current situation, we are re-examining all of the close races now, and assuming that in the current environment Democrats should be given the benefit of the doubt over Republicans. The game is now the Democrats' to lose.
In Minnesota's 6th District, conservative state Sen. Michele Bachmann (R) holds on to the slimmest of leads over child safety advocate Patty Wetterling (D) in what is normally solid Republican territory. Districts such as that of Rep. Heather Wilson (R-N.M.), always closely divided, cannot be counted on to perform as in the past, given that the tide running away from the GOP right now.
Some districts now merit Democrats' efforts and resources in a way they never could have just two weeks ago. Republicans are on the defensive all across the map, and the map keeps getting bigger. The one race where Republicans have any serious chance of a pickup -- against Rep. Melissa Bean (D-Ill.) -- could prove a disappointment in today's political climate, particularly given the decades of neglect shown by former Rep. Phil Crane (R-Ill.) toward the local party and the tools and organization it needs -- and lacks -- to win tough, close elections there.
If there is any lesson to be learned from the Foley Affair, it is that campaigns and elections can take very unpredictable turns and that trends often fail to play out as expected due to big news events. If it weren't for the Democrats' lack of funds, a tsunami-like gain would be a certainty. As matters stand, there may be time to avert the disaster that we currently see rolling toward the GOP Congress. Democrats +21, Republicans -21.
Republican-Held House Seats In Play | |||
Likely Republican Retention | Tossup | Likely Democratic Takeover | |
Leans GOP | Leans Dem | ||
AZ-1 (Renzi) | CO-4 (Musgrave) | CT-2 (Simmons) | AZ-8 (Open) |
AZ-5 (Hayworth) | CT-5 (Johnson) | CT-4 (Shays) | CO-7 (Open) |
CA-11 (Pombo) | IL-6 (Open) | FL-22 (Shaw) | IN-2 (Chocola) |
CO-5 (Open) | KY-3 (Northup) | IA-1 (Open) | IN-8 (Hostettler) |
FL-8 (Keller) | MN-6 (Open) | IN-9 (Sodrel) | FL-16 (Open) |
FL-13 (Open) | NV-2 (Open) | KY-4 (Davis) | NC-11 (Taylor) |
NV-3 (Porter) | NY-24 (Open) | NM-1 (Wilson) | NY-26 (Reynolds) |
NY-20 (Sweeney) | OH-1 (Chabot) | OH-18 (Open) | TX-22 (Open) |
TX-23 (Bonilla) | OH-2 (Schmidt) | PA-6 (Gerlach) |
|
WY-AL (Cubin) | OH-15 (Pryce) | PA-7 (Weldon) |
|
| PA-8 (Fitzpatrick) | PA-10 (Sherwood) |
|
| WA-8 (Reichert) | VA-2 (Drake) |
|
|
| WI-8 (Open) |
|
Democrat-Held House Seats In Play | |||
Likely Democratic Retention | Tossup | Likely Republican Takeover | |
Leans Dem | Leans GOP | ||
IL-17 (Open) | GA-8 (Marshall) |
|
|
LA-3 (Melancon) | GA-12 (Barrow) |
|
|
OH-13 (Open) | IA-3 (Boswell) |
|
|
OH-6 (Open) | IL-8 (Bean) |
|
|
PA-12 (Murtha) | SC-5 (Spratt) |
|
|
| TX-17 (Edwards) |
|
|
| VT-AL (Open) |
|
|
| WV-1 (Mollohan) |
|
|
Colorado-5: This race does not belong on the chart, and it should be a cause for alarm among Republicans that it is even considered competitive. This district is the stereotypical solid GOP district, home of the Air Force Academy and the social-conservative group Focus on the Family. State Sen. Doug Lamborn (R) suffers somewhat from the enmity of the man he would succeed, Rep. Joel Hefley (R). His opponent, Jay Fawcett (D), is a military veteran.
It must be noted, however, that the recent Mason-Dixon poll showing this race in a tie is one in a series of worthless polls this company has conducted of 400 registered (not likely) voters in some of the state's congressional districts. Likely Republican Retention.
Indiana-9: A rare case of rising Republican strength right now is the apparent resurgence of Rep. Mike Sodrel (R), whom we have long held to be a goner. A Sodrel staffer has dedicated a 527 group to his continued survival in office, and Sodrel is wealthy enough to keep his campaign in the hunt no matter what.
Polling in the district suggests that the Foley scandal is not reaching this corner of Indiana -- likely because freshman Sodrel has no real connection to it, and his opponent, former Rep. Baron Hill (D), is basically as much of a Washington incumbent as he is, having been defeated just in 2004.
Of all things, Sodrel is suddenly in the best shape of the three endangered Indiana incumbent Republicans. But that isn't saying much. Hill is still favored to win. Leaning Democratic Takeover.
New York-26: Just how bad is it looking for National Republican Congressional Committee Chairman Reynolds? He now trails his opponent, millionaire businessman Jack Davis (D), by double digits. Given his (albeit minor) involvement in the page scandal, Reynolds's need to save himself also takes away from Republican efforts elsewhere. His staff remains hopeful that he can turn things around.
The overall point of below is that it looks like both the House and Senate are slowly slipping away from Republicans. Both are still in play and could be retained, but Republicans are very much teetering on the edge and are in need of further recovery. The past week has been filled with supposedly good news, but it hasn't been good enough for the races that matter.
In case you haven't heard of it before, I'd recommend subscribing to the Evans-Novak Political Report, or reading it online when you can. It's a very honest and accurate look at the political climate, and contains a lot of valuable information/analysis you probably won't hear elsewhere.
This week's issue is particularly interesting in its analysis of the House races:
http://www.humanevents.com/evansnovak.php?id=17258#3
Evans-Novak are currently predicting that Democrats will net 14 House seats, picking up 15 and losing 1. The chart shown is just of Republican held seats. A chart of Democratic seats in play is here, but is mostly irrelevant since so few Democratic seats are in play.
Democrats do need 15 to win, but based on previous charts, things seem to be sliding slowly but surely the Democrats' way. More and more Republican seats are in play, including seats that should not ordinarily be in play, like Jean Schmidt's (OH) and Marilyn Musgrave's (CO) seats. The continued +14/-14 prediction masks the fact that, over the past week alone, 1 more Republican seat moved to "leans Republican" from "likely Republican," 1 more seat was added "in play" as "likely Republican," (from "strong Republican" off-chart) and 1 seat moved from "leans Democrat" to "likely Democrat."
As that chart grows in length (13 Republicans are now on the edge just beyond the 15 likely pickups), the prospects of a Democratic takeover become increasingly likely, since there are more and more opportunities for that single necessary seat to fall by chance. After all, nothing can be predicted with absolute certainty.
Note also Novak's comments about how Howard Dean may spoil Democrats' chances of taking back the House. If I were a Democrat, I'd be pretty pissed at him for his stupid "50 state strategy" or lack thereof. In a season this close, the DNC's irrelevance could be pivotal.
Meanwhile, it looks like the Senate is no longer completely beyond Democrats' reach, though I would still say Democrats only have an outside chance there, especially because of Kean in NJ.
I'm still trying to wrap my head around Harvard's decision to end its Early Action program. Harvard's claim that their decision was based on a desire to make the admissions process more "fair" for poor applicants who, because of their limited accesss to advising systems, would be less able to take advantage of such EA programs, seems highly suspect to me. I am not convinced that Harvard cares about this, nor do I think that they should. Harvard's purpose is the advancement of education, not the general social welfare. The idea that they are pursuing the interests of the poor to their own detriment is laughable; the idea that they ought to is, I think, misguided.
So how can we read into this decision some reaction that benefits Harvard? I haven't really talked about this very much with other people, so my idea is pretty tentative and I'd be very interested to hear other suggestions, but allow me to suggest one possible scenario.
Other things equal, it benefits a school to have an early action or early decision application process. Early Decision, obviously, is helpful because it locks in all applicants who apply through it and are accepted. Early Action is less decisive, but, probably, applicants who are accepted through Early Action are less likely to apply to schools that they might otherwise have been interested in, even preferred (due to their secure position, the stress of filling out apps, gratitude to the institution that accepted them, and desire not to alienate their friends/classmates by "taking their spots" in the regular process).
However, other things equal, it may also be advantageous for relatively elite universities that other universities not have early programs. If early programs elsewhere lock students into a school, Harvard would probably prefer that top students, who may not apply to Harvard because they are forced to choose one school and may fear Harvard's low acceptance rate, not be sucked in by other schools' ED/EA programs.
So what to do? It would seem that the best situation for Harvard would be to have an ED program, and have all competitors not have ED/EA programs. But other institutions would hardly go along with this plan.
So... Perhaps Harvard has calculated
A) The benefit of having an ED/EA program is outweighed by the cost of other schools having ED/EA programs.
B) That by ending EA and claiming that it is doing it to help disadvantaged students, it can win some PR capital and perhaps through shame and its leadership position in higher education persuade other schools into ending their ED/EA programs, thus potentially losing less top applicants to other schools.
Thoughts?
I wanted to write a note about Harvard's recent decision to drop its Early Action program - it seems that a lot of people have bought into the move on the assumption that this will help disadvantaged students, and that it is therefore good. However, the reasons given by the admissions office were not just that it would help disadvantaged students - the admissions office also claimed that Early Action and Early Decision programs increase the stress that applicants feel, and that that also had to be combatted.
For me the jury is out on the issue of disadvantaged students, since Harvard has always claimed - and I believe them - that the standards for Early Action are not more lax than for Regular Action. People keep pointing to the statistics that a far higher percentage of EA students have been admitted than RA students, but that is almost certainly due not only to the quality of the applicant pool, but also to the fact that Harvard only takes students in EA that they would take in regular admission anyway. After all, if Harvard isn't absolutely sure that they want to admit a student EA, they have never had much to lose by deferring a decision. Moreover, the claim that EA favors students who don't need financial aid is also seriously suspect, since EA (unlike binding Early Decision) implies no commitment on the applicant's part. If the nonbinding Early Action program hurts disadvantaged students, the impact can't be great, and in any case it rings hollow to hear the Admissions Office make such claims as long as they continue to openly favor (on the margin) legacies, and implement a Z-list. At most this is a sort of guilty way of avoiding those bigger issues, and I am just not convinced that a drastic change like this was a better choice than simply addressing the issue directly. Not that they haven't been doing that already, by the way, with the low/middle income initiative and major recruiting efforts. The facts just don't add up.
But the thing that I really can't understand is the claim that this will reduce the stress level of high school seniors considering applying to Harvard. Really? Because it seems to me that if adopted nationwide, this policy would DRAMATICALLY increase high school seniors' stress levels.
Right now, nonbinding Early Action programs provide students with the opportunity to have a sure "in" at a specific school before they even send in their applications for other schools. The practical significance of that policy is to substantially reduce the number of applications that a student admitted under an EA system has to submit. One girl I know who just matriculated to Harvard was admitted to one of her other favorite schools in a nonbinding EA round, and subsequently decided to only submit applications in the RA round to the 5 other schools (including Harvard) that she might conceivably choose over that first school. She was admitted to Harvard and declined to matriculate to the first school. But had she been rejected by the first school, or not been given the option to apply early in the first place, she probably would have applied to at least a dozen other schools, in order to have several options at each level of competitiveness. Because nothing would have been certain by the time she applied RA, she would have had to go all-out in order to feel confident that she would be able to attend the best school (according to her) that would accept her.
In sum, Harvard's policy, if adopted by many other schools, seems likely to dramatically increase the number of applications that students send to colleges. Given the already obscene volume of such applications, I fail to see how this could be a positive development, for either admissions offices or for their applicants.
I do oppose binding Early Decision programs (ED) (as distinct from Early Action, EA), because they cut off a student's options entirely and would seem to favor students who are willing to commit at that early date without seeing other options. That clearly benefits students who don't have to worry about financial aid considerations, and whose guidance counselors (if they even have them) have their act together. It also seems to be a tool to increase schools' US News "yield" scores, which could be the topic for an entirely separate post. But ED is completely different from EA, and it is disingenuous for Harvard to imply that they are the same policies.
Ultimately, I think that the reaction of the rest of the higher education world to this decision has probably been similar to their reaction to the Curricular Review - Is Harvard continuing to show leadership as a university, or is it simply blundering around without a clear sense of purpose or adequate attention to all sides of the issues it addresses? My vote would be for the latter.
HARVARD REPUBLICAN CLUB WHITE PAPER ON MOHAMMAD KHATAMI
Contact: Stephen Dewey
gop@hcs.harvard.edu
Saturday, September 9, 2006
For Immediate Release
The Harvard Republican Club calls on its members and all sensible people in the Harvard community to challenge Mohammad Khatami on his distorted view of Middle Eastern international relations during his visit to the Kennedy School tomorrow. Tell Khatami the world cannot afford to trust Iran until it suspends its nuclear enrichment program, verifiably closes the door to any and all nuclear weapons, and stops meddling in Lebanon and Iraq.
Much of the recent controversy over Khatami's visit has centered on his past policies, but we are primarily concerned about the future now that Ahmadinejad is at the helm. What worries us is Khatami's tacit and occasionally explicit support for Ahmadinejad's policies, including the latter's sinister anti-Americanism and anti-semitism, cynical support for terrorism in Lebanon and Iraq, and gravely disturbing brinksmanship on the nuclear issue. For Khatami to deliver Sunday's speech without distancing himself from these policies of Ahmadinejad would be unconscionable.
This white paper is divided into three sections:
1. KHATAMI'S DISTORTED AND DANGEROUS INTERNATIONAL VIEWS
2. MISCONCEPTIONS OF KHATAMI'S DOMESTIC POLICIES
3. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS
***Khatami's Distorted and Dangerous International Views***
Khatami's views on international relations in the greater Middle East leave much to be desired, including common sense and honesty. Khatami has become very skilled at political spin on such issues, insisting he wants rapprochement with the United States while opposing the necessary steps to achieve that, stating he does not seek Israel's destruction while supporting Hezbollah's "resistance," and blaming President Bush for Middle Eastern terrorism while turning a blind eye to his own government's support of Iraqi and Lebanese terrorist groups.
Khatami will claim in his speech at the KSG Forum that Iran's nuclear weapons program is entirely peaceful. It is important, then, that Harvard students come armed with the facts of the situation. Here are a few such facts:
Iran's contemporary nuclear program began under Khatami's presidency (Aug. 1997-Aug. 2005), during which period Iran took steps that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has determined violated the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). [1] This included covertly purchasing 1.8 tons of nuclear material from China, and running a secret uranium conversion program, a necessary precondition of the enrichment cycle. [2] While the safeguards agreement by which Iran was governed at the time allowed its pursuit of peaceful applications of nuclear technology (i.e. nuclear power plants), it also required Iran to report such activities so that the IAEA could verify it was not siphoning off nuclear materials for less benign purposes. [3] The fact that Iran declined to do so, coupled with the discovery of previously unknown enrichment and heavy water plants around the same time (at Natanz and Arak) [4], raises a serious red flag about Iran's intentions.
To make matters worse, that same year IAEA inspectors discovered traces of highly enriched uranium (HEU) at one of the previously hidden plants (Natanz), a grade of uranium that is used in nuclear weapons, and would never be necessary for the nuclear power plants Iran claims to be pursuing. [5] At best, this highly enriched uranium was present because Iran covertly purchased nuclear reactor materials from the A.Q. Khan network, run by the developer of Pakistan's dangerous nuclear weapons program, who sold them parts of centrifuges used by Pakistan to develop its own nuclear weapons, which then remained contaminated by such activities. [6] According to the Council on Foreign Relations, Khan is also known to have sold nuclear weapons technology to North Korea and Libya. [7]
Sunday's attendees should ask the hard questions that Khatami would rather not answer: If Iran's intent is purely peaceful, why did Iranian officials conceal the existence of the plants at Natanz and Arak from the IAEA and the world community until they were exposed by an Iranian dissident group in Paris? [8] The NPT guarantees peaceful applications of nuclear technology to all signatories - so what did Iran have to hide? And why did it feel compelled to seek support from the A.Q. Khan black market rather than from a legitimate state supplier? Khatami has a lot of explaining to do.
Khatami's position on politics in the eastern Medterranean region may actually be worse. When asked to distance himself from Ahmadinejad's support for the destruction of the state of Israel and denial of the Holocaust, Khatami is quick to point out that he does not share those views. But it is difficult to take such statements seriously when he endorses Hezbollah as a legitimate "resistance group," telling Al-Arabiyya TV last year that "We [Iranians] love Hezbollah." [9]
Sunday's attendees should ask Khatami - against what, exactly, does he believe Hezbollah is legitimately "resisting"? The "occupation" of Shebaa Farms? What right has Hezbollah as a Lebanese group to repeatedly inject itself into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to the detriment of both sides? Hezbollah is perhaps the Middle East's greatest tragedy, responsible for the deaths not only of hundreds of Israelis, but also of thousands of Lebanese. For Khatami to praise them, and to fail to condemn his government's responsibility for arming them, militarizing the region and goading them into endless war, is completely disgusting.
In particular, the combination of Khatami's founding of Iran's nuclear development program and his support for an armed-to-the-teeth Hezbollah makes us very concerned about his views on the state of Israel. Actions speak louder than words, and the actions Khatami has taken and endorsed are exactly what his maniacal successor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, needs to fulfill his dream that Israel be "wiped out from the map." [10]
We stand with decent-minded people everywhere in condemning Ahmadinejad for those intentions, in condemning Khatami's provision of the necessary means for their accomplishment, and in expressing our support for the state of Israel in this difficult time.
Lastly, Khatami would like to believe that President Bush is responsible for all the violence in the Middle East [11], but he conveniently ignores his country's own role in perpetuating the insurgency in Iraq. By now it is clear that Iran is deliberately providing improvised explosive devices (IED's) to Iraqi insurgents, who then use them to kill American troops with roadside bombs. [12] These IED's are lethal, can penetrate tank armor, and are hard for us to guard against. Iran's goal is to increase American casualties enough to force us out of the country, so it can profit from the power vacuum that will result. This has mostly occurred after Khatami left office, but it clearly contradicts his self-righteous view of Iran's peaceful role in the broader Middle East.
Sunday's attendees should ask Khatami to denounce his country's own role in fanning the flames of Middle Eastern violence, by supplying weapons to both Hezbollah and Iraqi insurgents.
***Misconceptions of Khatami's Domestic Policies***
Khatami's disastrous foreign policies notwithstanding, he does have a record of attempting to curb the power of Iran's oppressive and unelected Guardian Council and Supreme Leader, moves we support. He did also attempt to introduce some domestic reforms promoting democracy, freedom of expression, rule of law, free markets and women's rights. [13] Unfortunately, the Islamic fundamentalist Guardian Council found both reform proposals threatening and blocked them, a common theme in Iran, and the reason for the country's current political backwardness. Meanwhile, Islamic hard-liners allied with the Guardian Council beat, arrested and killed Khatami's own supporters on a regular basis, many of the violations of human rights that some are now inappropriately laying at Khatami's own feet. [14]
Claims that Khatami "presided over" human rights abuses ignore the fact that Khatami's office was little more than a figurehead. As The Economist points out, Khatami's conservative opponents had control of the military, the state security forces, the "morals police," the volunteer paramilitaries and the judiciary, and had veto power over Parliament. [15] Virtually the only power Khatami did have was the bully pulpit. How Khatami can be blamed for the actions of political opponents who had de facto executive powers and greatly outpowered him is difficult to understand.
In the end, Khatami's reformist supporters in the Iranian Parliament were actually thrown out of office in an election rigged by Ahmadinejad's hardliner wing in cooperation with the Guardian Council, paving the way for Ahmadinejad's election. [16] Khatami and Ahmadinejad are far from political allies.
The CIA acknowledges as much. From the CIA's World Factbook: "Following the elections of a reformist president [Khatami] and Majlis in the late 1990s, attempts to foster political reform in response to popular dissatisfaction floundered as conservative politicians prevented reform measures from being enacted, increased repressive measures, and made electoral gains against reformers. Parliamentary elections in 2004 and the August 2005 inauguration of a conservative stalwart as president [Ahmadinejad], completed the reconsolidation of conservative power in Iran's government." [17]
Or consider the following report from the independent group Human Rights Watch, which addresses the issue in great detail: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/iran/Iran0501.htm [18]
We want to emphasize that we do not even come close to supporting every domestic policy, action or pronouncement that Khatami made during his tenure. His gradualist approach frequently led him to make compromises that many would consider unacceptable. In the end, ironically, his moderate approach and attempts to work with Islamic hardliners may have doomed his reform efforts by preventing him from defending his allies from intimidation, coercion and imprisonment. But that does not make him guilty of such crimes.
We also want to emphasize that we have no special desire to protect Khatami from any legitimate criticism that might be leveled at his domestic policies. If our analysis of the domestic situation under his presidency is wrong, then we will gladly retract this portion of our statement and join in such criticism.
Until then, however, the evidence contradicting the claims currently leveled at Khatami's domestic policies is too overwhelming and widespread to ignore, and the sources we have cited attest to that. Even a cursory inspection of such claims reveals that their basis is suspect, and our respect for the truth does not allow us to ignore that reality.
We do, of course, unequivocably and emphatically deplore the domestic policies of Khatami's Islamic hardliner opponents, of the Guardian Council, of the Supreme Leader, and of current President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Unlike Khatami, Ahmadinejad uses his influence to provide cover for the activities of Iran's "legal" and extra-legal statist thugs who use violence to crush all dissent to their implementation of an Islamic theocracy. Ahmadinejad marches in lockstep with the Guardian Council and the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, the folks who really run the show.
***Additional Comments***
There is already a media circus surrounding Khatami's visit, and it is only likely to increase throughout tomorrow. Everybody seems to want to use Khatami's visit as an excuse to promote their own views on the Iranian crisis, American foreign policy, and, of course, Harvard University.
This has inevitably resulted in a round of commentary on Khatami's mere presence at the IOP Forum, even though it is well known here that the IOP regularly seeks out controversial and even unsavory speakers to complement its lineup, and doesn't even come close to endorsing them.
Are the IOP's critics aware that that the Forum has hosted such conservative speakers as Karl Rove, Pat Robertson, Ken Mehlman (twice), William Kristol (8 times), Irving Kristol (twice), Jerry Falwell (twice), Ralph Reed (twice), Sen. McCain (twice), Doug Feith, N. Gregory Mankiw, Andrew Sullivan, and Phyllis Schlafly, among many others? Does anybody imagine that Harvard thought that it was endorsing such speakers when it invited them? Obviously not. We think this has become yet another opportunity to take an easy shot at Harvard without giving the University any reasonable benefit of the doubt.
We would encourage students to think critically about the issues raised by Khatami's visit and not participate in the sideshow of political posturing that is currently afoot. Consider the facts we've provided above as well as what you will hear from all sides on Sunday, and come to your own conclusions, as informed citizens should. We do think the views we have expressed above will hold merit in such an environment.
***References***
1. "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran". International Atomic Energy Agency. Adopted by IAEA board on 11-26-2003. Accessed 9-9-2006. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-81.pdf
2. "Iran: Nuclear Overview." Nuclear Threat Initiative. Accessed 9-9-2006. http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/1819.html
3. c.f. note 1.
4. c.f. note 2.
5. c.f. note 2.
6. "A.Q. Khan & Iran". GlobalSecurity.org . Accessed 9-9-2006. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/khan-iran.htm
7. "The Legacy of A.Q. Khan." Council on Foreign Relations. September 5, 2006. Accessed 9-9-2006. http://www.cfr.org/publication/11316/legacy_of_aq_khan.html
8. c.f. note 2.
9. Transcript of interview on Al-Arabiyya TV, July 14, 2005. Translated and provided by MEMRI (the Middle Eastern Media Research Institute) in Special Dispatch Series - No. 1279. http://www.memri.org/bin/opener_latest.cgi?ID=SD127906
10. "Iranian leader: Wipe out Israel". CNN.com. October 27, 2005. Accessed 9-9-2006. http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/10/26/ahmadinejad/
11. "Ex-Iranian leader blames Bush policies for terrorism". CNN.com. September 4, 2006. Accessed 9-9-2006. http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/09/04/iran.khatami/index.html?section=cn
12. "Iraq Weapons -- Made in Iran?" ABC News. March 6, 2006. Accessed 9-9-2006. http://abcnews.go.com/International/IraqCoverage/story?id=1692347&page=1
13. "Profile: Mohammad Khatami". BBC Middle East. June 6, 2001 (just prior to re-election). http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1373476.stm
14. "Iranian reformist MPs complain of wave of death threats". Agence France Presse - English. International News. June 24, 2003.
For those without Harvard Library access:
http://www.harvardgop.org/khatami/afp1.html
See also:
"Iranian radicals beat up reformist member of parliament". Agence France Presse - English. International News. December 6, 2003.
For those without Harvard Library access:
http://www.harvardgop.org/khatami/afp2.html
15. "God's rule, or man's?". The Economist. January 16, 2003. http://www.economist.com/surveys/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=1522068
16. "Iranian clerics ban reformists from polls". Daily Telegraph. December 1, 2004. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/01/12/wiran12.xml&sSheet=/portal/2004/01/12/ixportaltop.html
See also:
"Profile: Mohammad Khatami [updated 2 years later]". BBC Middle East. June 30, 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3027382.stm
17. "Iran: Introduction". The World Factbook, published by the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States. Accessed 9-8-2006. https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/ir.html
18. "Stifling Dissent: The Human Rights Consequences of Inter-Factional Struggle in Iran". Human Rights Watch. Accessed 9-9-2006. http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/iran/Iran0501.htm
"Because at some point you have to ask yourself: who’s really doing more damage to the American way of life? A few isolated terrorists, or us?" [Implied: By temporarily limiting carry-ons in the immediate aftermath of a thwarted terrorist attack?]
I understand that it's in Democrats' interests to play down terrorist attacks but, seriously, this is just tacky.
Update:
There has been a good deal of back and forth in the comments. I think its useful to note that the above opinion is Markus's and not Democrats' in general, even if it is representative of what some Democrats may believe (on DemApples, for example, no one has explicitly endorsed this view yet, 2 commenters have made sympathetic comments, and 2 others explicitly rejected it).
Markus has said a good deal in his defense, but none of it even begins to get him from point A (his fundamental "disagreement" as to the root causes of terror) to point B (news coverage of the attempted attack was hysterical and the current safe-guards are draconian, even inimical to the American way of life).
Let's grant that a "war on terror" is a rhetorical nothing, that the causes of terror are fundamentally cultural, and that an aggressive response to terrorism may result, at least in the short term, in more terrorists. I don't think I'd particularly disagree on any of these points. But how Markus gets from these assumptions to the conclusion that we absolutely shouldn't temporarily ban liquids when we have just broken up a terrorist cell planning to blow up a plane by mixing separately-harmless-but-together-volatile liquids is beyond me. Arresting terrorists and preventing them from destroying airplanes mid-atlantic may be working against the symptoms, not the causes, of terrorism, but the deaths of hundreds of people are, nonetheless, symptoms worth preventing. And the prevention of those deaths is also a story worth reporting.
Hopefully, the threat has passed. But is the benefit of temporary vigilance against the possibility of, say, a few members of the cell who might not have been captured, so small as to warrant Markus's sneering? Or is Markus just acting out his own little kabuki dance of disparagement against threats that have the wrong political flavor? You decide.
When war broke out between Israel and Hezbollah several weeks ago, a common criticism of Israel's tactics on Harvard email lists was that Israel should have gone after Hezbollah, and not the Lebanese people collectively. For example, Jade Jurdi (who was in Lebanon at the time) argued in a July 13 DemsTalk email that:
"You ask what Israel should do, I will tell you what Israel should have done
logically rather than using collective punishment on the Lebanese people of
which only about 20 percent count themselves as supporters of Hezbollah. They
should have attacked Hezbollah bases and infastructure."
This line of criticism, unfortunately, gives a false set of options for Israeli action. While certain Israeli strikes have indeed intentionally targeted non-Hezbollah infrastructure (strikes on the Beirut airport and coastal radar positions in the north, for example), it seems a fair assumption, especially in light of recent stories, that the vast majority of innocent fatalities have in fact occurred in Israel's attempt to target Hezbollah specifically. The argument that Israel must target Hezbollah instead of Lebanon thus becomes largely irrelevant: we must either accept civilian casualties as an unfortunate side effect of Israel's legitimate and necessary actions or argue that they make pursuit of even Hezbollah itself indefensible.
This is a pretty worthwhile slideshow. Like many Reuters/AP slideshows, it can get pretty repetitive, but there are a least a few pictures definitely worth seeing, to get some perspective on the crisis:
As we watch the crisis that is rapidly unfolding in the Middle East, Americans need to take a step back and think about the consequences of what is going on here. So far, the rest of the world outside of the Middle East (including our government) has been completely worthless, recycling their old position statements about who is in the right and who is in the wrong, rather than trying to actually affect the situation. We are fiddling while the Middle East burns. The only real actors right now are Israel, Hizb Allah, Lebanon, Palestine, Hamas, Syria and possibly Iran. They are determining the actual situation through military action and possibly covert ops (Iran, Syria). The rest of the countries of the world, including the G8, might as well be bloggers sitting around and putting in their $0.02 but not actually changing anything (but unlike actual bloggers, they have the power to do something if they wanted to).
Americans need to decide what our ideal outcome is and take concrete steps to achieve it. It is not enough for us to simply give Israel the green light and side with them regardless of what they do because of their legitimate right to defend themselves. This DOES affect our own national interests, and we cannot simply assume that this situation will continue to develop in a vacuum. We have troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, and these could quickly become involved if the situation escalates further. We also have an interest in seeing that Lebanon does not fall apart, as it was supposed to be the best example of a developing democracy in the Middle East.
Things could get even worse. Think about the following doomsday scenario (which I am not saying is likely to happen, but it is illustrative of the way in which things can blow up out of control):
- Iran finds a way to enter the conflict and assumes the mantle of the "defender of the Muslim world." Perhaps Iran acquires Hizb Allah's prisoners. Or perhaps it makes good on its threat to defend Syria from "Israeli aggression."
- So Iran attacks Israel and/or US forces in Iraq (which it views as complicit in "Israeli crimes")
- Israel and/or the U.S. respond to attacks on their respective forces with an air strike on Iran. Iran continues to fight back.
- Fear abounds about potential Iranian use of biological or chemical weapons (which it does actually have). Ahmadinejad makes matters worse by claiming to be ready to launch a nuclear missile at Israel in retaliation for Israeli actions in Lebanon, Syria and Palestine (even if he doesn't have one).
- The U.S. and/or Israel respond with a massive air strike on Iranian military facilities.
- North Korea decides to make a power play and come to Iran's aid by launching additional missiles at Hawaii. Unlike previous "tests," these missiles are unlikely to fail, since the scientists behind them will assuredly be killed if they fail a second time.
- What if we can't shoot the missiles down, and we actually get hit by a North Korean missile? Our defenses are patchy at best.
- At this point, anything could happen.
Look, World War 1 started at least in part because of the assassination of a single politician (plus related tension). Already, matters are more serious than that. (EDIT: What I mean is that more than one politician has already been assassinated. So this is nominally more serious. The reality is that WW1 was in many ways an accident. The point is that you don't have to want to have a world war in order to have one. Conflicts can take on a life of their own.)
Before you dismiss everything I've said above as crazy, I want to say that I don't think that that scenario is likely, or that things might not happen completely differently. What I do think is that the risk of things continuing to escalate is very high right now, and we cannot simply assume that U.S. interests will not be affected by this. It is time for us to take control of this situation.
This is all the more necessary because I don't think that Israel is being completely rational right now. They are going to tear Lebanon apart, which in no way is in their best interests. They have so far failed to clearly demarcate their operations against Hizb Allah from their operations against Lebanon as a state. Right now, I think we really need to do 2 things:
1. Force a disarmament / destruction of Hizb Allah once and for all.
2. At the same time, rein in Israel and keep them from doing further damage to the Lebanese state. Force them to refocus their energies on Hizb Allah alone, and also to work with Lebanon in that regard rather than against Lebanon as if the entire country is Israel's enemy.
Ok, so I just woke up about 90 minutes ago and it appears a lot of dramatic acts have taken place overnight (our time) in response to the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers and killing of 7 more by Hizb Allah, a Lebanese Shi'ite Muslim militant group and political party (Hizb Allah is a more accurate spelling than Hezbollah, btw, since it literally means Party of Allah).
A quick summary of those actions: Israel has taken military steps to hold the country of Lebanon as a whole responsible for the actions of Hizb Allah. Broadly, these actions include assaults on Hizb Allah strongholds in Southern Lebanon, a naval/air blockade of Lebanon, and bombing Lebanon's main airport in Beirut.
I chose the title for this post because I think the bombing of Beirut's airport was excessive and inappropriate considering the actual situation in Lebanon, of which Israel is fully aware. (I think all of its other actions today have been justified, which I explain at the bottom.)
Anybody who knows anything about Lebanon knows that while Hizb Allah is a Lebanese political party and claims about 30% of the country as adherents, most of the rest of the country is either ambivalent towards Hizb Allah (the Sunni Muslims), or hates them (the Maronite Christians). While they are considered part of the government - the main justification for blaming all of Lebanon for their actions - the government does not support their actions.
The worst that can be said about the Lebanese government is that it has shown an inappropriate level of tolerance to the group, in an effort to avoid internal conflict. But while political will has certainly been lacking in Lebanon to do something about the problem, it is important to recognize that even had there been sufficient political will, the Lebanese government has not had anywhere near the military/police force necessary to actually force the group to disarm. Again, we are talking about a group that comprises about 30% of the country, is very radical, and is heavily armed. (Actually, it is probably accurate to say that political will has been lacking because military/police capacity has been lacking.)
Moreover, it is important to remember that the Lebanese government is a very fragile alliance of the 3 major religious groups in the country (Sunni Muslims, Shiite Muslims and Maronite Christians, all of which are roughly equal in size). The government does not have the same sort of independence as a separate entity that we are used to in America. The "Lebanese government" is better thought of as a fairly fragile agreement between those three groups. More to the point, it is also important to remember that those groups were at war with each other until very recently, in the Lebanese Civil War of the 1980's - that is where the drinking game "Beirut" gets its name, because the ping pong ball is supposed to be like the bombs that were tearing the country apart for a decade.
So not only has the government not had the power necessary to deal with Hizb Allah, it also has not had the mandate to do so - even people who really hate Hizb Allah, like the Maronite Christians and many of the urban Sunnis, probably would not have supported an effort by their leaders to disarm Hizb Allah, out of the (realistic) fear that it would start a new civil war.
Finally, it is important to recognize that until now, Hizb Allah has actually been losing influence in Lebanon. They lost the battle to keep Syria in Lebanon, and ever since the Israeli withdrawal in 1996, they have had difficulty convincing the Lebanese that their grievances are legitimate. That is why they have had to create issues out of thin air, like the ridiculous claim that Israel was still occupying Lebanese territory in the form of the Shebaa Farms.
EDIT: I should have made it more explicit... The current situation, if Lebanon feels attacked as a whole, will give Hizb Allah the legitimacy it has currently been lacking. So it will be counterproductive both for Israel and for the Lebanese who dislike Hizb Allah. Who needs Shebaa Farms if Israel reoccupies all of Southern Lebanon?
UPDATE: An unsubstantiated claim from Drudge: "Guerrillas who captured Israeli soldiers are trying to 'transfer them to Iran'"
If that is true, well, holy s**t... God help us all...
***SO, WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE ISRAELI RESPONSE?***
In light of all I've said, I think that the best thing Israel can do right now is to apply military force with the three following objectives in mind:
1. Destroy Hizb Allah's capabilities as much as possible. That is what they have been doing with the raids on Southern Lebanon (Hizb Allah's stronghold).
2. Make it clear to Lebanese Shi'ite Muslims that Hizb Allah's illegitimate and terroristic actions will only lead to their own suffering. This has also been accomplished by attacking Southern Lebanon, because those attacks will certainly have a negative impact on the civilians living there. While those civilians might blame Israel for their suffering, deep down, they have to know that it would never have happened had their political party not engaged in fruitless "me too"-ism over the past several years by jumping into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. (And if they fail to realize that Hizb Allah is their worst enemy, well, then it is hard to say that they don't deserve the consequences.)
3. Provide political cover to non-Hizb Allah Lebanese politicians, and create a situation in which the Sunnis and Maronite Christians can combine to finally force Hizb Allah to disarm.
The third objective is something that might be impossible, but Israel can try. The naval and air blockade is a good first step, because it amounts to Israel putting its foot down and saying that Lebanon will face sanctions until it does something about Hizb Allah. This is the mandate that Lebanese politicians need to take action. It will take time, and anti-Israeli sentiment will impede the effort, but we have to assume that upstanding politicians like the Hariris will ultimately do what is best for their people.
But the bottom line of this post is: Israel cannot and should not treat Lebanon as a homogeneous entity when it is clearly extremely heterogeneous. It's not fair, and it's also not in their own best interests.
---
PS: Apologies to all those who have posted comments to my previous posts, to whom I have not responded. The reality is that although it is summer, I am actually quite busy with a startup company and am trying to avoid spending too much time on blogs. I will try to get to you eventually, however I hope this most recent post will clarify my perspectives a bit.
One of the constant discussions about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is which side is more responsible for the continued violence and bloodshed, since the conflict has been going on for so long and both sides have made mistakes and pushed limits from time to time.
In light of that, I think it's really important to look at what has been happening over the past week or so with the abduction of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit by Palestinian militants (see http://reuters.myway.com/article/20060704/2006-07-04T113920Z_01_L02539614_RTRIDST_0_NEWS-MIDEAST-DC.html). This is a ridiculous situation that is entirely the fault of Palestinian militant groups, including Hamas. They are going to singlehandedly start another war in the Middle East.
They've managed to put both themselves and Israel in a position where neither is capable of negotiating or backing down, and where escalation is basically the only option that either side faces at this point. Israel can't "give something in return" for Shalit, because it would reward the unprovoked act of kidnapping him, and would lead to future abductions, making no Israeli citizen safe. Meanwhile, Hamas have also put themselves in a position where they cannot simply back down and give Shalit back to Israel without getting something in return, because they have already made demands and it would be a sign of weakness, something that Middle Eastern Arabs are determined not to show to Israel. Also, both governments are new and have to prove to their people that they are capable of strength.
So, the only way out of this without a full-blown war is either a diplomatic solution in which some 3rd country gives the militants something in exchange for releasing Shalit, allowing both sides to save face, or a successful commando raid that brings him back alive without Palestinian consent.
Barring that, we are almost certainly going to see a full-blown war in the Middle East, including assassination of Palestinian leaders and possibly even Syrian President Bashar Assad. It is imporant to remember, then, that if that happens, the war will be entirely the fault of Palestinian militants.
I think it is pretty telling that a lot of the world is already blaming the entire situation on Israel, which did not ask to have its soldier kidnapped. The focus on the "humanitarian tragedy" from Israel's invading Gaza in an attempt to find Shalit is also a ridiculous red herring designed to spin this against Israel. If other countries and their media are willing to spin even this against Israel, I think it calls into question their impartiality and validates the perception that they are irrationally anti-Western.
Anyway, that's my $0.02 on this. I haven't seen something this outrageous in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for quite some time.
[Update: A less credulous Stephen Dewey has informed me that the below is a rather dry joke from Volokh Conspiracy blogger Dale Carpenter. In my enthusiasm, I did not read the post carefully enough to pick up the rather low key clues to this. Until such a time as President Bush actually does adopt the below as his policy, let this post stand as a critique of the hypocrisy of his current - and apparently unchanged - stance toward the FMA.]
Via Volokh, there is news that Bush will soon give a statement announcing his decision to retract his support for the FMA. An excerpt from the statement:
“Two years ago, in this place, I announced my support for a constitutional amendment defining marriage as the union of one man and one woman. I strongly believe that’s what marriage is and should be. If I were a state legislator or a governor, I’d oppose defining marriage in any other way. I supported the amendment because, at the time, I feared that uncontrollable judges and local officials were recklessly and lawlessly playing with the foundation of the American family.
“But I was wrong. Like others, I overreacted to what seemed like an emergency. I did not have sufficient faith in the historic processes of American government. The local officials who were defying state law in 2004 have been brought into line. DOMA is still good law. The states have begun amending their own constitutions to define marriage. I have appointed many federal judges in the mold of Justices Scalia and Thomas, including two to the Supreme Court, who will not tamper with marriage. And while I still fear that some state courts will attempt to redefine marriage in years to come, I am confident that the people in those states can deal with their own courts if that is what they choose to do. After all, that is what we have always trusted them to do.
It's good to see Bush giving a little more respect to the federalist principles that the Republican party is supposed to respect. Note that he bases his decision not to support constitutional action on the supposition that, with the conservative base of the Supreme Court reinforced, there will be no federal-judicial "final solution" to the gay marriage debate, as there was for the abortion debate in Roe v. Wade.
Also, check out volokh.com in general, they've had a lot of coverage of the FMA lately.
It looks like at least one of the bloggers at DemApples has come out of the closet as a strict constructionist, textualist, constitionalist! Rwinikates, in a recent post, writes:
Let’s go to the text of the 1st Amendment here guys: “Congress shall make no law.. abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press…” That makes it sound like, wow Mr. Gonzalez-Attorney Genral-Man, you actually don’t have that obligation because any law that might support you is unconstitutional!
Who knows where he'll go next with this logic? Maybe he'll realize that campaign finance reform laws and candidate speech regulations illegal. And what else will he find in the Constitution? Perhaps Democrats will decide that "...the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed" actually means that the right to bear arms shall not be infringed. Or might they discover that the ninth and tenth amendments are not simply empty platitudes - that they actually mean that "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others..." and "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." Let's not even mention the eleventh amendment!
All of which is to say that un-nuanced textualist outrage is pretty empty if you're not prepared to tread a consistent textualist line.
The Wall Street Journal has an interesting piece (link for subscribers) today that lends some insight into why anti-price gouging laws are a bad thing. A study by the Federal Trade Commission in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina finds two intersting and seemingly contradictory results.
The first is well summarized in the following quote from the study that the article cites: "In light of the amount of gasoline production and pipeline capacity eliminated by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita ... and the inelastic response of consumer demand to gasoline price changes, the post-hurricane gasoline price increases at the national and regional levels were approximately what would be predicted by the standard supply-and-demand model of a market performing competitively."
The second result is summarized in the lead paragraph: "The U.S. Federal Trade Commission Monday said it has found 15 cases of gasoline price gouging in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita last year." It should be noted that this result of 15 price gouging refiners, wholesalers and retailers came in a study of just 77 such establishments. In other words, almost 20 percent of the firms studied were guilty of "price-gouging."
These two results, of a "market performing competitively" and 20 percent of firms price gouging their consumers may seem contradictory to you. But if so, you obviously don't know how Washington works.
The answer to this puzzle comes succintly in the third paragraph of the article: "Congress told the FTC to define 'price gouging' as an instance when the average price of gasoline in September 2005, post-Hurricane Katrina, was higher than the average price of gasoline in that same area in August 2005." So in other words, when a hurricane knocks out 90 percent of oil extraction in the Gulf of Mexico--cutting total market supply by about 11 percent--and demand skyrockets because thousands of consumers need to drive long distances to get out of harm's way, it is "price-gouging" for firms to raise their prices.
This is why we can't trust Washington politicians to pass anti-price-gouging laws. Much as we would like to curb sharp increases in price above replacement costs, the free market already does this. If I charge significantly more for my gas or oil than my competitor, everyone will go to the guy--often literally--across the street. Thus, price increases in a market as competitive as that of gasoline and oil (at least among non-state owned producers) will reflect real changes in supply and demand that if suppressed, will just make things worse.
Think what would happen if gas stations, for instance, were not allowed to raise their prices in a crisis. With their costs spiking, they would find it extremely unprofitable to bring the additional gas into the area that would help address the additional need. And with prices held down, people who had no plans to flee would fill up their gas tanks "just in case," while many who really need it would find the gas stations out of gas when they arrived. My own parents down in Houston did the former (even though they had no plans to leave town) right before Hurricane Rita and there were widespread reports of people being stranded by emtpy gas pumps while trying to leave town. (Texas has strict anti-price gouging laws with fines of up to $20,000 per violation.) The only thing worse than a hurricane coming to town is a hurricane coming to town with price controls in place.
Yet people seem uniquely unable to understand this phenomenon. When Katrina struck, every politician from President Bush on down condemned "price-gouging." I remember trying to explain to someone I was working with last summer why "price-gouging" was necessary, and her response was disgust and anger with me for making such an argument. Even in an RSEP session with Republicans disposed towards the free market, I found it difficult to convince people that so-called "price-gouging" was a necessary response to a bad situation that actually made things better off than they would otherwise be.
Politicians are no better than their electorate, and in this area, the whole country could use a good course in introductory economics.